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1. Peace Treaty Between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France and Their Respective Allies
(Treaty of Westphalia), Oct. 24, 1648,  available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/westphal.htm.  The
treaty ended the Thirty Years’ War in Europe and established self-determination as the basis for the forming
of nations.  This basis for the establishment of a sovereign nation is acknowledged in the Charter of the United
Nations.  U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2.  It was also acknowledged in Article 10 of the League of Nations
Covenant, the precursor to the United Nations.  League of Nations Covenant art. 10; see also R.R. PALMER &
JOEL COLTON, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD 148 (7th ed. 1992) (explaining the influence of the Treaty
of Westphalia on international law and the modern system of sovereign states).
2. Oscar Schachter, The Decline of the Nation-State and its Implications for International Law, 36
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 7, 7 (1997) (“The state, long seen as steadily amassing power, is now being
viewed as increasingly vulnerable, even on its way out.”); JEAN-MARIE GUÉHENNO, THE END OF THE
NATION-STATE (Victoria Elliot trans., 1995); Vivien A. Schmidt, The New World Order, Incorporated: The
Rise of Business and the Decline of the Nation-State, DAEDALUS, Spring 1995, at 75; The Shape of the
World—The Nation-State is Dead. Long Live the Nation-State, ECONOMIST, Jan. 5, 1996, at 15-18;  see
also LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 10 (1995) (“We might do well to relegate
the term sovereignty to the shelf of history as a relic from an earlier era.”); Richard B. Lillich, Sovereignty
and Humanity: Can They Converge?, in THE SPIRIT OF UPPSALA: PROCEEDINGS OF THE JOINT UNITAR-
UPPSALA UNIVERSITY SEMINAR ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER
406 (Atle Grahl-Madsen & Jiri Toman eds., 1984) (“[T]he concept of sovereignty in international law is
an idea whose time has come and gone.”).  Sub-nationalism has also been examined as a contributing factor
to the death of the nation-state.  See Stephen Tierney, Reframing Sovereignty? Sub-State National Societies
and Contemporary Challenges to the Nation-State, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 161, 161 (2005). In addition,
the influence of new actors, such as non-governmental human rights organizations, has played a role in the
nation-state’s demise.  See LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 737-45 (1999).  Others have argued that
rumors of the death of the nation-state are greatly exaggerated.  See Martin Wolf, Will the Nation-State
Survive Globalization?, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 178, 179 (2001).
THE CORPORATION AS SOVEREIGN
Allison D. Garrett*
I.  INTRODUCTION
In the past two hundred years, sovereignty devolved from the monarch to the
people in many countries; in our lifetimes, it has devolved in several significant ways
from the people to the corporation.  We are witnesses to the erosion of traditional
Westphalian concepts of sovereignty,1 where the chess game of international politics
is played out by nation-states, each governing a certain geographic area and group of
people.  Eulogies for the nation-state often cite globalization as the cause of death.2
The causa mortis is characterized by the increase in the power and normative influence
of supranational organizations, such as the United Nations, World Bank, European
Union, International Monetary Fund, and non-governmental organizations.  Today,
geography lacks the political significance it once had, as valuable commodities
instantly pass over, through, and under geographic borders in the world’s most
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3. See WALTER B. WRISTON, THE TWILIGHT OF SOVEREIGNTY: HOW THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION
IS TRANSFORMING OUR WORLD 61-62 (1992).  Likewise, distances have lost meaning.  Ben Bernanke,
Chairman of the Federal Reserve System, noted recently:  
Economically relevant distances . . . may also depend on what trade economists refer to as
the width of the border, which reflects the extra costs of economic exchange imposed by
factors such as tariff and nontariff barriers, as well as costs arising from differences in
language, culture, legal traditions, and political systems.
. . . [B]y most economically relevant measures, distances are shrinking rapidly. The
shrinking globe has been a major source of the powerful wave of worldwide economic
integration and increased economic interdependence that we are currently experiencing. The
causes and implications of declining economic distances and increased economic integration
are, of course, the subject of this conference.
Ben Bernanke, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s Thirtieth Annual Economic
Symposium: Global Economic Integration: What’s New and What’s Not? (Aug. 25, 2006), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2006/20060825/default.htm.  See also David R. Johnson
& David G. Post,  Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1367 (1996).
4. Schachter, supra note 2, at 8. 
5. See JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER 25
(2004) (“Corporations now govern society, perhaps more than governments themselves do; yet ironically,
it is their very power, much of which they have gained through economic globalization, that makes them
vulnerable.”).  While corporations have gained power, it does not follow that if one state loses some
measure of sovereignty, another state, supranational organization, or corporation necessarily gains it.  See
Neil MacCormick, Beyond the Sovereign State, 56 MODERN L. REV. 1, 16 (1993) (arguing that sovereignty
is not the object of a “zero sum game, such that the moment X loses it Y necessarily has it”).
6. See  Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and Political Accountability, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507
(2001) (drawing general connections between privatization and political accountability); Jack M.
Beermann,  Administrative-Law-Like Obligations on Private[ized] Entities, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1717 (2002)
(arguing that the effect of privatization is likely to be muted by the recent phenomenon of a reduction in
the differences between the government and private sector); Ronald A. Cass, Privatization: Politics, Law
and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 449, 450-56 (1988) (discussing the theory of privatization and explaining
how the law may affect privatization efforts); Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing
Foreign Affairs and the Problem of Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV.
135, 141-42 (2005) (arguing that accountability and public values may be increased by “an era of
privatization”); Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions, and the New Administrative Law, 52
ADMIN. L. REV. 813 (2000) (arguing that contemporary administrative regulation is “best described as a
regime of ‘mixed administration’ in which private actors and government share regulatory roles”); Jody
Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1285 (2003)
(arguing that privatization may be a means of “publicization,” where private actors may be convinced to
commit themselves to traditionally public goals in return for lucrative opportunities to provide goods and
services historically provided by the state); Louis Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV.
201 (1937) (noting that the most significant and powerful components of the political and social structure
of the United States are economic interests groups); George Liebman, Delegation to Private Parties in
American Constitutional Law, 50 IND. L.J. 650 (1975); Gary Peller, Public Imperialism and Private
common language, binary code.3  Telecommunications, when combined with mobile
capital and technology, “is viewed as obliterating spatial lines.”4  All of these changes
have made the nation-state, as a geopolitical entity, far less significant than it has been
in the past several decades.
Corporations have stepped into this power vacuum with a reach and economic
influence so broad that some of the duties of sovereign nations have fallen under their
aegis.5  The power and influence of the world’s major corporations continue to grow,
and with this growth their similarities to sovereign states increase.  As the nation-state
is prematurely eulogized, scholars are writing about the privatization of governance
and commerce.6  Many scholars tend to focus on international relations and the extent
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Resistance: Progressive Possibilities of the New Private Law, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1001 (1996) (reflecting
upon the emergence of the “New Private Law Phenomenon”);  Ira P. Robbins, The Legal Dimensions of
Private Incarceration, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 531, 539 (1989) (presenting a comprehensive legal discussion
of private action); David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165 (1999) (advocating for
future research and doctrinal development of legal research on the private security industry); Symposium,
New Forms of Governance: Ceding Public Power to Private Actors, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1687 (2002); Note,
Delegation of Governmental Power to Private Groups, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 80 (1932).
7. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2000).  It is the nature of the activity, rather than its purpose, that controls
whether the foreign state or its agencies or instrumentalities have immunity for their actions.  Id. § 1603(d)
(defining “commercial activity”).
to which relationships among nations have been transcended or superseded by private
actors.  For example, the concept of nations acting as private entities has been
recognized in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,7 which provides that “a foreign
state shall not be immune . . . in any case in which the action is based upon a
commercial activity carried on in the United States by a foreign state.”8  This Article
focuses, instead, on how the distinction between corporations and the state is blurring,
not only internationally, but also domestically, as corporations act in ways that make
them similar to nation-states.  
The nation-state is not dead, but it is evolving.  A pivotal factor in this evolution
is the power of the world’s largest corporations.  Like the vassal whose power
overshadows the king’s, these companies act similarly to traditional nation-states in
some ways.  They have tremendous economic power, establish security forces, engage
in diplomatic, adjudicatory and “legislative” activities, and influence monetary policy.
However, it is important to recognize that corporations are not mini-nations, and
nations are not overgrown corporations; it would be dangerous to conflate the two.
Like any theory about the nature of corporations, this analogy between nations and
corporations can be taken to an extreme.  Although corporations seem to be amassing
new powers and taking on new roles, there will always be limits placed on them by
governments.  Governments conduct investigations and inspections and pass laws and
regulations to keep corporations in line.   The court system can be used both by the
government and by private actors to constrain the activities of corporations.  The
Fourth Estate also scrutinizes the actions of corporations.  Indeed, the press can serve
as a powerful check on corporate power, as the “name and shame” process can cause
consumers to vote with their wallets, which in turn can affect the actions of the
corporation and, ultimately, its survival.
This Article begins in Part II by examining the historical and theoretical advent
of the corporation as a legal, social, and political entity, by exploring the various
theories regarding the nature of the corporation.  Furthermore, Part II surveys the
theoretical underpinnings of the social construct known as the nation-state.  Part III
considers the similarities between modern multinational corporations and nation-states,
including the characteristics of permanent population and defined territory, economic
power, foreign relations, protection of society, administration of justice, monetary
policy, and public welfare.  This Article concludes by positing that a comparison
between the often analogous social, political, and economic characteristics of nation-
states and corporations can provide a new and useful way for scholars to analyze the
activities and powers of modern-day corporations.  
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9. Examples of charters creating “bodies corporate and politic,” collected by Professor Greenwood,
include the Plymouth Council, the Massachusetts Bay Company, Connecticut, The Treasurer and Company
of Adventurers of the City of London for the First Colony in Virginia, and The Hudson Bay Company.
Daniel J.H. Greenwood, The Semi-Sovereign Corporation 2-3 (University of Utah Legal Studies Research
Paper Series, Paper No. 05-04, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstracts=757315. 
Professor Greenwood notes that the same phrase “is used in the Charter of Dartmouth College, the
Incorporation of Harvard College, and in the charter of the College of William and Mary.”  Id. at 4.  See
also Samuel Williston, History of the Law of the Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 HARV. L. REV. 105,
105 (1888) (noting that “the most striking peculiarity found on first examination of the history of the law
of business corporations is the fact that different kinds of corporations are treated without distinction”). 
Currently, it is generally the states that charter corporations, although federal law may determine
whether a corporation exists for certain purposes, such as federal taxation.  Kurzner v. United States, 413
F.2d 97, 100 (5th Cir. 1969); cf. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4) (West 2007) (recognizing, for the purposes of the
Internal Revenue Code, corporations organized “under the law of any state”).
10. 1844, 7 & 8 Vict., c.110 (U.K.).
11. 140 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3rd ser.) (1856) 134. 
12. Id. 
13. Greenwood, supra note 9, at 2. 
14. See GlobalFinancialData.com, The Global History of Currencies, https://www.globalfindata.com/
index.php3?action=showghoc&country_name=UGANDA (last visited Nov. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Global
Financial Data] (“Beginning in 1895, the Imperial British East Africa Company minted coins denominated
in Rupees, Annas and Pice, following the British Indian monetary system.”).
15. The British East India Company, although established as a trading company, assumed governing
authority for India.  JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY OF
A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 21-26 (2003).
16. Id. 
17. John Dewey, The Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926).
II.  THEORIES ON THE CORPORATION AND THE NATION-STATE
A.  Theories of the Corporation
Many of the earliest corporations were granted charters from the Crown that made
them both corporations and political entities.9  The corporate form was not widely
available and these charters were granted on an ad hoc basis, often in accord with the
ebb and flow of political expediency.  When Parliament passed the Joint Companies
Act10 in 1844, Robert Lowe, then Vice President of Great Britain’s Board of Trade,
referred to corporations as “little republics.”11  Specifically, Lowe noted that, “[h]aving
given [corporations] a pattern the State leaves them to manage their own affairs and
has no desire to force on these little republics any particular constitution.”12
Professor Daniel J.H. Greenwood has explored in detail the rights of early
corporations, particularly those rights that are similar to the rights of the sovereign.
Professor Greenwood notes that, “in the beginning, everyone understood that corpora-
tions were somewhat sovereign” and that “[i]ndeed, the British East India Company
claimed aspects of sovereignty—the right to have its contracts treated as international
treaties and the right to make war.”13  These early corporations even minted money.14
Some of these companies governed expansive territories15 and maintained standing
armies that, at times, engaged in military action.16  Today’s corporations may never
gain the measure of power held by the earliest companies at their apogee, but they
seem to be trying.  
The ontology of the corporation encompasses a number of theories regarding the
nature of corporations.  Corporations have been described as a person,17 private
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18. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Profits, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE, Sept. 13, 1970, at 32.
19. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structures, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (based on work by Armen A. Alchian &
Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777
(1972));  see also  STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 27-33 (2002) (describing
the corporation as nexus of contracts); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATION LAW 17 (1991) (“All the terms in corporate governance are contractual in
the sense that they are fully priced in transactions among the interested parties.”); William T. Allen,
Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1400 (1993) (“[T]he
corporation is seen as the market writ small, a web of ongoing contracts (explicit or implicit) between
various real persons . . . designed to reduce the costs necessary to plan, coordinate and accomplish the
complex contracts that large-scale ongoing projects would require.”); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein,
The Contract Clause and the Corporation, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 767, 770 (1989); Henry N. Butler, The
Contractual Theory of the Corporation, GEO. MASON U. L. REV., Summer 1989, at 99;  William J. Carney,
Controlling Management Opportunism in the Market for Corporate Control: An Agency Cost Model, 1988
WIS. L. REV. 385 (1988); Brian R. Cheffins, The Trajectory of (Corporate Law) Scholarship, 63
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 456, 484 (2004). But see John C. Coffee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out, the Contractual
Theory of the Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 919, 923 (1988)
(suggesting a more rigorous review of the “corporation as contract” theory).
20. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY  221 (1933); Jensen &  Meckling, supra note 19, at 308-09.  
21. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (“If the stockholders are displeased with the
actions of their elected representatives, the powers of corporate democracy are at their disposal to turn the
board out.”).  But see Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW.
43, 45-46 (2003) (arguing that corporations are undemocratic because managements’ board nominees are
usually unopposed); Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV.
833, 849-50 (2004) (arguing that the United States should eschew the view of the “modern corporation as
a ‘purely representative democracy’”); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Markets and Democracy: The Illegitimacy
of Corporate Law, 74 UMKC L. REV. 41, 41 (2005) (“Corporate law is chosen by the very corporate
managers who ought to be controlled by it, and created by lawyers, legislatures and judges unanswerable
to the people whose lives are affected by it.”).
22. Douglas Litowitz, The Corporation as God, 30 J. CORP. L. 501 (2005).  
23. See Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 569 (1819); FREDERIC W.
MAITLAND, Moral Personality and Legal Personality, in 3 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM
MAITLAND 304, 305-06 (H.A.L. Fisher ed., Logos & Co. 1975) (1911).
24. See, e.g., Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886); San Mateo v. S. Pac. R.R.
(Railroad Tax Cases), 13 F. 722, 740 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882); Natasha N. Aljalian, Note, Fourteenth
Amendment Personhood: Fact or Fiction?, 73 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 495, 497-98 (1999).  Corporations do
not, however, have the privilege against self-incrimination.  Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 89-90
(1974); United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7 (1970).
25. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02(4) (2002).
26. Id. § 3.02(7).
27. Id. § 3.02(1); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 19, at 11.
property of the shareholders,18 a nexus of contracts,19 an agent for the owners,20 a repre-
sentative democracy,21 and even a religious entity.22  
Currently, corporations are viewed as legal persons, and have been regarded as
such for almost 200 years.23  As legal persons, corporations are entitled to some
constitutional protections.24  They have the right to hold property,25 to contract,26 and
to sue and be sued as a juridical entity distinct from their shareholders, directors and
employees.27  Corporate law theorists have more recently come to view the corporation
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28. Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Shareholders, Nonshareholders and Corporate Law:
Communitarianism and Resource Allocation, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 393, 396-97 (1993) (arguing that
corporations are subject to public regulation because they are public entities).
29. Liam Séamus O’Melinn, Neither Contract nor Concession: The Public Personality of the
Corporation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 201 (2006).  Professor O’Melinn notes that:
The corporation is a special kind of moral personality for which the law has made extensive
accommodation. . . . First, although many of the most important developments in corporate
law have resulted from the efforts of the nonprofit institution, the business corporation has
undeservedly received the exclusive attention of corporate law theorists.  Corporate law is
the result of a common course of development shared by the profit and the nonprofit
organizations, but the business corporation, by achieving pride of place as the corporation,
has become divorced from its heritage and has been allowed to masquerade as a purely
private institution.  Second, given the important role that the nonprofit institution has played
in the growth of corporate law, it is clear that shareholder primacy cannot be the ultimate
goal of corporate law.  Third, the public character of the corporation justifies greater
regulation of corporate activity in the public interest. 
Id. at 201.
30. William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L.
REV. 261, 264 (1992).  
31. Friedman, supra note 18, at 32-33.  A number of leading corporate law cases strongly support the
property conception of the corporation.  See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,
506 A.2d 173, 181-82 (Del. 1986) (recognizing the duty of the board of directors to maximize the financial
interest of shareholders in the face of a hostile takeover); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684
(Mich. 1919) (“A business organization is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
shareholders.”).  See also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (1994) (“[A] corporation should have as its objective the conduct of
business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.”); Lynn A. Stout, Bad
and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1190 (2002) (“Does the
firm exist only to increase shareholder wealth (the ‘property’ theory)? Or, should managers also seek to
serve the interests of employees, creditors, customers, and the broader society (the ‘entity’ view)?”).
32. Allen, supra note 30, at 265.
33. ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 119-125 (1932) (discussing the separate identity and function of ownership and control groups
within the corporate system and the potential conflicting interests of the two).
34. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) (arguing that financial
efficiencies are created by concentrating authority within a firm in a manager who directs production).
35. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 19 (describing the firm as a set of structured relationships
between a group of individuals and a “central agent” or “employer”); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems
as a special type of legal entity that has been and should be regulated28 and
accommodated in unique ways.29  
Delaware Chancellor William T. Allen has described the two general schools of
thought about the nature of corporations as the “property conception” and the “social
entity conception.”30  Under the property conception, the corporation is viewed as the
private property of its shareholders, with the ultimate goal of profit maximization on
behalf of the shareholders.31  Under the social entity conception, the corporation’s
purpose “includ[es] advancement of the general welfare.”32  
The view of the corporation as a profit maximization vehicle for the corporation’s
shareholders is closely related to two other concepts: agency theory and shareholder
primacy.  The corporation was first analyzed using agency theory in the 1930s.  The
bifurcation of ownership and management was identified by Adolph Berle and
Gardiner Means33 and then expanded by Ronald Coase.34  The agency theory of the
corporation has become one of the most-widely accepted theories of the firm.35  The
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and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980) (discussing the efficiency of separating security
ownership and control within a corporation); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and
Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON. 327 (1983); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of
Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983) (discussing the benefits of allocating the duty of
initiating and implementing decisions to one group within an organization and the ratification and
monitoring of decisions to another); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 19.
36. See Manuel A. Utset, Towards a Bargaining Theory of the Firm, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 540, 550-69
(1995).
37. Id. at 552-53.
38. See, e.g., Reza Dibadj, Reconceiving the Firm, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1459, 1462 (2005).  Professor
Dibadj notes that the flawed premise that corporations are “utility-maximizing actors” has led to poor public
policy decisions.  Id. 
39. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 19, at 308-09.
40. Attempts to align interests of the executives with the interests of the shareholders can be most
closely seen in stock option plans and restricted stock grants.  Paying bonuses for good performance also
helps align interests.
41. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 278-79 (1998).
42. Id.
43. Stephen Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2002).
44. Id. at 6-7.
45. Allen, supra note 30, at 265.
46. Id.
theory holds that markets and contracts limit the discretion that can be exercised by
corporate managers.36  These agents, who are linked by contracts to the firm, influence
its actions.  A central feature of the agency theory is that agents of corporations, as
rational economic actors, will take steps to minimize agency costs.37 However, this
view has been criticized.38  Professors Jensen and Meckling argued that “there is good
reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal”
and that, consequently, there is an agency loss because a corporation will not be
managed as well by an agent for the owners as it would be if the owners themselves
managed the corporation.39 For this reason, compensation schemes often attempt to
align more closely the interests of executives with those of shareholders.40  
More recently, the idea that corporations exist solely to maximize the wealth of
their shareholders and the agency theory have evolved into the “shareholder primacy
theory” of the corporation, which holds that corporations operate in the interest of the
shareholders and that directors owe to them a fiduciary duty.41  Furthermore, the theory
stresses that corporations are subject to shareholder control “by electing directors,
approving fundamental transactions, and bringing derivative suits.”42  In contrast, some
have espoused the “director primacy” theory, articulated by Professor Stephen
Bainbridge,43 which assumes that the board of directors wields the power within a
corporation.44
The social entity theory posits that successful corporations have a moral
imperative, not only to make money for their shareholders, but also to improve the
general welfare of society in some significant way.45 Arguably, it is a corporation’s
ability to enhance society’s welfare that makes it so successful, whether it is providing
lower cost goods to families with limited disposable incomes or creating ways for
communities with similar interests to communicate with each other.  The social entity
theory is compatible with the legal entity approach because, under this view, the
corporation is “capable of bearing legal and moral obligations.”46
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47. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97
NW. U. L. REV. 547, 560 (2003) (explaining that a corporation’s powers “flow not from shareholders alone,
but from the complete set of contracts constituting the firm”); Allen, supra note 30, at 264-65; Allen, supra
note 19, at 1400; Butler & Ribstein, supra note 19, at 770; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 19, at 306-07
(arguing that the corporation is the nexus of principal-agent contracts); Paul G. Mahoney, Contract or
Concession? An Essay on the History of Corporate Law, 34 GA. L. REV. 873, 878-93 (2000).  Contra
Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations: A Comment on Easterbrook and
Fischel, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449 (1989) (arguing that the contract metaphor, like other metaphors for the
corporation, is an imperfect fit).
48. Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1182 (7th Cir. 1990) (“A
corporation is not a living person but a set of contracts the terms of which determine who will bear the brunt
of liability.”); see also REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE
AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH § 1.2.1 (2004) (“As an economic entity, a firm fundamentally serves as a
nexus of contracts: a single contracting party that coordinates the activities of suppliers of inputs and of
consumers of products and services.”); Bainbridge, supra note 43, at 16 (giving as examples of the
contracts to which the corporation is a party a bond indenture, an employment agreement and a collective
bargaining agreement); O’Melinn, supra note 29, at 202.
49. G. Mitu Gulati et al., Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L. REV. 887, 895 (2000).
50. Id. at 894.
51. Id.
52. Litowitz, supra note 22, at 501.
53. Id. at 502.
54. Id. at 503-04 (citing MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 1.40(4) (2002)).
55. Id. at 509-13.
Additionally, many modern courts and corporate law theorists have come to view
the corporation as a nexus of contracts.47  Under this theory, the corporation is really
just “an agreement, or a series of agreements, among private parties.”48  The nexus of
contracts theory provides a basis for the director primacy theory and the shareholder
primacy theory, both of which explain the balance of power within the corporation,
rather than the role of corporations as participants in broader governance processes
such as foreign relations, adjudication, and law making.  A further variation on the
contractarian approach abandons the idea that the corporation itself is the nexus.49  The
“connected contracts” metaphor  “emphasizes the complex interactions among all of
the participants in an economic venture.”50  Under this approach, although the term
“contract” is used, it is used simply as a way to describe the rights and obligations of
these participants, whether they are legally enforceable or not.51
Some commentators have gone so far as to analogize the corporation to a religious
entity.  Professor Douglas Litowitz argued in a recent article that the corporation is
“fundamentally a religious and mythological entity” and “a secular god.”52  He argues
that we worship business leaders53 and that the Model Business Corporation Act’s
definition of a corporation, which uses the term “corporation,” is not unlike God’s
statement to Moses, “I am who I am.”54  Further, he argues, a mythology has developed
concerning corporations that can assist in resolving issues of corporate law.55
Professor Litowitz states: 
The pressing issues of corporate law [such as] whether a corporation should resemble
a functioning democracy, whether it has duties to a community, whether it should be
allowed to move offshore, whether it has a race or gender, whether it has rights to free
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56. Id. at 536.
57. Id.
58. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV.
247 (1999).
59. Id. at 249 (citing Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 19; Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams,
13 BELL J. ECON. 324 (1982)).
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Susanna M. Kim, Characteristics of Soulless Persons: The Applicability of the Character
Evidence Rule to Corporations, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 763, 794 (“Because a corporation has the capacity
to be an intentional actor and to modify its actions after learning of unintended harmful consequences, it
may be regarded as a morally responsible being.”).
62. See Michael Keeley, Organizations as Non Persons, 15 J. OF VALUE INQUIRY 149, 149 (1981)
(rejecting the idea that a corporation is a moral person because it has no “goals or intentions”); Michael B.
Metzger & Dan R. Dalton, Seeing the Elephant: An Organizational Perspective on Corporate Moral
Agency, 33 AM. BUS. L.J. 489, 493 (1996) (“Whatever organizations may be, they are not people.”);
Manuel Velasquez, Why Corporations Are Not Morally Responsible for Anything They Do, in COLLECTIVE
RESPONSIBILITY: FIVE DECADES OF DEBATE IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ETHICS 111, 120 (Larry May
& Stacey Hoffman eds., 1991) (arguing that corporations are not moral persons because they are not
capable of acting intentionally).
63. Friedman, supra note 18, at 32.
64. BAKAN, supra note 5, at 34.  Professor Bakan notes “the corporation can neither recognize nor act
upon moral reasons to refrain from harming others.  Nothing in its legal makeup limits what it can do to
others in pursuit of its selfish ends, and it is compelled to cause harm when the benefits of doing so
outweigh the costs.”  Id. at 60.
65. Ernest Renan, What Is a Nation? in NATIONALISM IN EUROPE, 1815 TO THE PRESENT: A READER
49 (Stuart Woolf ed., 1996). Renan defined a nation as follows:
A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which, strictly speaking, are just one,
constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is in the past, the other in the present. One
is the common possession of a rich legacy of memories; the other is the actual consent, the
speech, [and] whether it must favor shareholders over employees . . . [are] questions
about the meaning of the modern corporation.56
One way to answer these fundamental questions, Litowitz argues, is to view the
corporation as a “modern deity.”57
Professors Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout have proposed a “team production”
theory of the corporation.58  They examine the agency theory, but note that common
law agency should be supplemented with the team production theory drawn from
economic literature.59  The team production theory posits that in certain situations,
“productive activity requires the combined investment and coordinated effort of two
or more individuals or groups.”60
Other scholars have discussed whether corporations are moral persons,61 with
many rejecting the notion.62  The moral imperative for corporations is to make
money.63  Under this view of the raison d’être for corporations, choosing socially
responsible action over profit maximizing action is immoral.64
B.  Theories of the Nation-State
Philosophers and political theorists have offered many definitions of the nation.
French historian Ernest Renan argued that the nation is a fusion of the various
populations that compose them, but rejected strict definitions based on ethnography,
language, geography, commerce, or interests.65  Conversely, Joseph Stalin opined that
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desire to live together, the will to continue to value the heritage that has been received in
common . . . . To have the common glories in the past, and will in the present; to have done
great things together, and to do more of them again: these are the essential conditions to
being a people.
Id. at 57-58.  Renan also called the nation “a soul . . .the outcome of a long and strenuous past of sacrifice
and devotion . . . a heritage of glory and regrets to share in the past; one and the same programme to be
realized in the future.”  Id. at 58.
66. JOSEPH STALIN, MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION: SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES 12
(1942).
67. J.M. KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY 346 (1992).  
68. JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 42 (Currin V. Shields
ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1958) (1861) (“[T]he ideally best form of government is that in which the sovereignty,
or supreme controlling power in the last resort, is vested in the entire aggregate of the community . . . .”).
69. MURRAY KNUTTILA & WENDEE KUBIK, STATE THEORIES: CLASSICAL, GLOBAL AND FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES 50 (Robert Clarke ed., 3d ed. 2000) (1987) (quoting FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN
SOCIOLOGY 78 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 1958)).  Weber’s thoughts were originally put forth in
a speech given in 1918 in Munich.  
70. JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT & DISCOURSES 16-18 (6th prtg. 1930).
71. ERIC J. HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780: PROGRAM, MYTH, REALITY 14-18
(2d ed. 1992) (noting that the old meaning of the word nation “envisaged mainly the ethnic unit,” while
recent usage stresses “political unity and independence”); see also BENJAMIN AKZIN, STATE AND NATION
8-10 (W.A. Robson ed., 1964) (noting that the term “nation” usually refers to common ethnicity).  But see
JOHN A. ARMSTRONG, NATIONS BEFORE NATIONALISM 3-9 (1982) (noting that the concepts of a nation and
an ethnic group have often been conflated).
72. The United Nations Charter states that one purpose of the United Nations is to develop friendly
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,
and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.  U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2.  For more
information on the principle of self-determination, see ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-
DETERMINATION (2004);  HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE
ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS (1990); NOMOS XLV, YEARBOOK OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY
FOR POLITICAL AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, SECESSION AND SELF-DETERMINATION (Stephen Macedo & Allen
Buchanan eds., 2003); Avishai Margalit & Joseph Raz, National Self-Determination, 87 J. PHIL. 439
(1990); Yael Tamir, The Right to National Self-Determination, 58 SOC. RES. 565 (1991).
a “nation is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic
life, and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture.”66  The Italian
jurist Pasquale Mancini similarly argued that nations were comprised of groups of
people united by several factors, such as language, history and territory.67  John Stuart
Mill defined sovereignty more esoterically as the “supreme controlling power.”68
Political theorist Max Weber viewed a nation as “a relation of men dominating men,”
a relation supported by means of “legitimate use of physical force within a given
territory.”69  According to Rousseau, sovereignty rests in a united people rationally
considering and deciding its own fate.70  Still others view ethnicity as the key
determinant for the existence of a nation-state.71  
The United Nations Charter recognizes self-determination as a primary test for
nationhood.72  Kofi Annan, in his annual speech to the United Nations General
Assembly in 1999, said:
State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined by the forces of
globalization and international cooperation.  The State is now widely understood to
be the servant of its people, and not vice versa.  At the same time, individual
sovereignty—and by this I mean the human rights and fundamental freedoms of each
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73. Press Release, Secretary General, Secretary-General Presents His Annual Report to General
Assembly, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/7136, GA/9596 (Sept. 20, 1999), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/
docs/1999/19990920.sgsm7136.html.  The United Nations has taken measures to regulate multinationals.
See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council (ESOCOC), Sub-Comm’n on Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, Norms
on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 13, 2003), available at http://www1.umn.
edu/humanrts/links/norms-Aug2003.html; see also Larry Catá Backer, Multinational Corporations,
Transnational Law: The United Nations’ Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations
As a Harbinger of Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
287 (2006) (discussing the impact that the United Nations’ Norms will have on corporate responsibility).
74. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165
L.N.T.S. 19.
75. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
201 (1986) (“Under international law, a state is an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent
population, under the control of its own government . . . .”).
76. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 213-44
(Edwin Cannan ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1976) (1776); see also Greenwood, supra note 9 (“If our major cor-
porations share many of the characteristics of sovereigns, they should share the responsibilities as well.”).
77. SMITH, supra note 76, at 213. 
78. Id. at 231.  Similarly, John Locke noted that the sovereign possesses “a right of making laws, with
penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties for the regulating and preserving of property.”  JOHN
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT 268 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). 
79. SMITH, supra note 76, at 244.
80. ELLEN GRIGSBY, ANALYZING POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL SCIENCE 50
(Wadsworth/Thomson Learning 2002) (1999). 
and every individual as enshrined in our Charter—has been enhanced by a renewed
consciousness of the right of every individual to control his or her own destiny. . . .
Nothing in the Charter precludes recognition that there are rights beyond borders.73
Today, a generally accepted view of what constitutes a state is found in the 1933
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States.74  That document provides
that “[t]he State as a person of international law should possess the following
qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and
(d) capacity to enter into relations with other States.”75
In The Wealth of Nations Adam Smith defined a state by its obligations to society,
and specifically identified three such obligations of the sovereign.76  These obligations
are “protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent
societies,”77 the “administration of justice,”78 and the duty of  “erecting and maintaining
those public institutions and public works, which though they may be in the highest
degree advantageous to a great society, are, however, of such a nature, that the profit
could never repay the expense to any individual or small number of individuals.”79
Later scholars have built on these duties identified by Smith.  Ellen Grigsby, for
example, noted that
[a] state is an organization that has a number of political functions and tasks,
including providing security, extracting revenues, and forming rules for resolving
disputes and allocating resources within the boundaries of the territory in which it
exercises jurisdiction. That is, states consist of government offices, which have the
tasks of providing the ultimate, or primary, security, extraction processes, and rule
making within a territory.80 
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81. STEVEN L. SPIEGEL ET AL., WORLD POLITICS IN A NEW ERA 700 (3d ed., Wadsworth/Thomson
Learning 2004).
82. Olli Lagerspetz, National Self-Determination and Ethnic Minorities, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1299,
1299 (2004); ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 1 (R.I. Moore et al. eds., 1983) (defining
“nationalism” as “primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should
be congruent”).
83. Lagerspetz, supra note 82, at 1299.
84. Id.
85. ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (Harper & Row 1946) (1932).
86. KURT VONNEGUT, JR., PLAYER PIANO (Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1966) (1952).
87. EDWARD BELLAMY, LOOKING BACKWARD (Daniel H. Borus ed., St. Martin’s Press 1995) (1888).
88. Litowitz, supra note 22, at 536.
Steven Spiegel describes the nation-state as “[a] state structure in which a nation
resides and exists (ideally) to protect and promote the interests of that nation.”81  
Some scholars have noted a technical difference in the terms “state” and
“nation.”82  These scholars contend that a state is a legal person capable of passing
laws and entering into treaties.83  A nation, on the other hand, can be more broadly
defined as a community bound by common factors such as culture, ethnicity, religion,
and history.84  Although all of these distinctions may be useful to international law
scholars, I do not draw such fine distinctions in this Article.  Rather, I look to a variety
of characteristics that philosophers, economists, and international law scholars have
ascribed to the nation-state.  Whether these are immutable characteristics of statehood
and whether they still apply with the same force today are important questions, but this
Article is limited to reviewing the strong parallels between the state and modern
multinational corporations.
The nature of the corporation and its relationship to the state has been explored
in literature, as well as in legal and economic scholarship.  Aldous Huxley’s Brave
New World seemed to anticipate this evolution of the corporation: the “T” for the
Model T car replaced the cross as a religious symbol, the “Ford” was worshipped and
dates were expressed as “A.F.” meaning “after Ford.” 85  Similarly, Kurt Vonnegut’s
Player Piano depicts a dystopia controlled by technology and corporations.86  Edward
Bellamy pictured the state as a national corporation in his book Looking Backward,
published in 1888, about a young man who falls asleep only to awaken in the year
2000.87
Each metaphor or theory regarding the nature of corporations has some merit, and
multiple views can and do coexist.  Professor Litowitz, in setting forth his view of the
modern corporation as a “modern deity,” wrote that “[h]opefully others will view the
corporation through the lens of cultural studies, history, literary criticism, [and]
sociology” as a means of “balanc[ing] out the economic approach that so dominates
corporate scholarship.”88 In this Article I respond, in part, to that call, and add the
following theory: that multinational corporations increasingly operate in many ways
like sovereign nations.  
III.  SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE CORPORATION AND SOVEREIGN STATES
The remainder of this Article discusses the devolution of sovereign powers to
private enterprise and the various forms of this devolution.  Specifically, the following
sections review the traditional characteristics and duties of sovereign nations
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89. 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 34, at 121 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed.
1992).
90. Aristide R. Zolberg, The Dawn of Cosmopolitan Denizenship, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 511,
511 (2000) (citing Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447 (2000))
(discussing the devolution of the concept of citizenship away from the nation-state to a “hypernationalist
version of citizenship”).
91. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 cmt. c
(1986). 
92. Catholic-pages.com, Vatican City: Population, http://www.catholic-pages.com/vatican/vatican_
city.asp (last visited Nov. 26, 2007).
93. See Wal-MartFacts.com, Employment and Diversity, http://www.walmartfacts.com/featuredtopics/
?id=3 (last visited Nov. 26, 2007).
94. Fordham Law School, Event Details, http://law.fordham.edu/ihtml/ eventitemPP.ihtml?id=37&idc=
6763&template=cle (last visited Sept. 14, 2006).
95. Id. 
96. Micheline Labelle & Franklin Midy, Re-Reading Citizenship and the Transnational Practice of
Immigrants, 25 J. OF ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 213, 217 (1999). 
articulated above and discuss the ways in which corporations have come to embody
these characteristics and assume the duties of nations.  These sections deal with the
characteristics of a permanent population and defined territory, economic power,
participation in foreign relations, the protection of society from violence and invasion,
the administration of justice, and the creation of public works and public institutions.
A.  Permanent Population & Defined Territory
Oppenheim describes one characteristic of the state as a permanent population,
that is, as a people who live together as a community.89  Yet, the view that a state has
a permanent population has waned in recent decades as populations have become more
transient.90  Further, even within the borders of a state, there are often disparate groups
of people who cannot be said to comprise a single community.  This would be true, for
example, of Kurdistan or Cyprus, where groups of people living under a single national
flag operate largely autonomously from the national government.  There is also the
related question of what size population is necessary to qualify a group of people as
a state.  According to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, “significant” size is necessary.91  Yet Vatican City has a permanent population
of only 840,92 while the world’s largest corporations have “populations” of several
hundred thousand.  Wal-Mart, the world’s largest private employer with almost two
million employees around the world, may be the best example of a large corporate
population.93  
Notions of citizenship are changing rapidly.  Fordham Law School sponsored a
two-day conference in September of 2006 entitled “New Dimensions of Citizenship.”94
Conference organizers noted that while citizenship theory has relied on the disciplines
of law, history, political science, and anthropology, theories of citizenship are evolving
to take into account the increasingly transnational nature of citizenship.95  These
theories have necessarily moved beyond economic globalization and the convergence
of financial markets; international capital may be mobile, but asymmetry exists when
the movement of capital is compared to the movement of individuals.96
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97. Political Scientist Ellen Grigsby notes that “the very origins of the word nation attest to such
foundations, because nation is based on the older Latin word natus (birth), and nations generally consist
of people whose sense of unity is based on something shared by virtue of the group into which they are
born.”  GRIGSBY, supra note 80, at 58.  See also WALTER BERNS, MAKING PATRIOTS 11 (2001) (arguing
that patriotism must “be cultivated because no one is born loving his country; such love is not natural, but
has to be somehow taught or acquired”).
98. Bruno S. Frey, Flexible Citizenship for a Global Society, 2 POL. PHIL. & ECON. 93, 94-95 (2003).
Frey proposes to transfer the citizenship relationship from the governmental realm “to a more general social
setting” and to conceptualize citizenship as temporary, multiple, partial, or organizational.  Id.
99. Id. (citing Linn Van Dyne et al., Organizational Citizenship Behavior: Construct, Redefinition,
Measurement and Validation, 37 J. OF MGMT. 765 (1994); Dennis W. Organ, The Motivational Basis of
Organizational Citizenship Behavior, in 12 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR: AN ANNUAL
SERIES OF ANALYTICAL ESSAYS AND CRITICAL REVIEWS 43 (Barry M. Staw & L.L. Cummings eds., 1990)).
100. See, e.g., KIM S. CAMERON & ROBERT E. QUINN, DIAGNOSING AND CHANGING ORGANIZATIONAL
CULTURE (1999); Bill Munck, Changing a Culture of Face Time, in HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW ON
CULTURE AND CHANGE (2002); E.H. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP (2d ed. 1992);
R. Charan, Conquering a Culture of Indecision, 79 HARV. BUS. REV. 75 (2001).
As these modern notions of citizenship emphasize the decreasing importance of
national borders, theories of corporate citizenship have taken root.  Individuals today
often self-identify more closely with their employer than with their country of birth.
In other words, a person’s work identity may transcend his or her national identity.
The corporation, like a nation, has its own unique culture.  Like immigrants to a new
country, new corporate employees go through a process of acculturation.  Similar to
a capitalist nation in which the strongest entrepreneurs succeed, the corporation is often
a meritocracy, allowing deserving employees to climb the corporate ladder and
participate in the corporation’s internal governance.
Citizenship in a particular country is the serendipitous accident of birth,97 while
association with a corporation is generally an affirmative choice based on market
factors.  These market factors have begun to affect residence to a large extent, and
citizenship to a lesser extent.  Individuals employed by multinational corporations
often have opportunities to work as expatriates in countries where the corporation has
operations.  Just as groups of people may, by virtue of these shared experiences or self-
determination, coalesce into a nation-state, so, too, may groups of people employed by
a corporation coalesce into some larger type of society.  Professor Bruno Frey, in
writing about citizenship in our global society, explained that:
[T]o be forced to have the exclusive citizenship of one particular nation only, is
inadequate for internationally highly mobile persons such as is the case with many
managers, artists, academics, sportsmen and sportswomen.  Moreover, multiple
identities going above and beyond nationality have become the rule.  But the present
system of citizenship in the nation-state also does not conform to the preferences of
the “average” persons, who often identify more with a lower level of government (for
example, their particular region) or a higher level of government (for example, Europe
as a whole) rather than with the national level.  Even more fundamentally, people
often identify more with other organizations such as NGOs or even with particular
firms rather than with the nation of which they happen to be citizens.98 
The concepts of organizational or corporate citizenship originated in the 1990s.99
Much has been written in the last several years about corporate cultures.100  One
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101. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD: HOW GLOBALISM AND TRIBALISM ARE RESHAPING
THE WORLD 17 (1996); see also Azizah Y. al-Hibri, The American Corporation in the Twenty-First
Century: Future Forms of Structure and Governance, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1399 (1997).  Professor al-Hibri
states that
the corporation is not just a production unit, a “cash cow,” or a profit center; it has become
a community for all those in it.  People spend most of their waking hours at work in the
corporation; they make friends there, have meals there, and derive much of their self-esteem
from work.  A corporation is therefore an important community for those who work in it,
and it significantly impacts on the society in which it is imbedded.
Id. at 1451-52.
102. See Miriam Erez, Make Management Practice Fit the National Culture, in THE BLACKWELL
HANDBOOK OF PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 419, 431 (E.A. Locke ed., Blackwell Pub.
2000).  Erez stresses that
[m]anagers should . . . take into consideration the cultural characteristics of both the
acquiring company and the acquired company.  For example, when an American company
acquires a Mexican company, it is not enough to know that the characteristics of the
American company facilitate the acculturation process.  One should also take into
consideration that the cultural gap between the two companies is quite high, and that it is
not easy to change the Mexican company’s culture.  
Id. 
103. See generally Uzoamaka P. Anakwe & Jeffrey H. Greenhaus,  Effective Socialization of Employees:
Socialization Content Perspective, 11 J. OF MANAGERIAL ISSUES 315 (1999) (examining the effectiveness
of corporate socialization measures); C.A. O’Reilly III, J. Chatman & D.F. Caldwell, People and
Organizational Culture: A Profile Comparison Approach to Assessing Person-Organization Fit, 34 ACAD.
OF MGMT. J. 487 (1991) (developing and validating a test for assessing person-organization fit, which
predicts job satisfaction and organizational commitment to an employee). 
104. Erez, supra note 102, at 431. 
scholar noted that there now exists “a new breed of men and women for whom religion,
culture, and ethnic nationality are marginal elements in a working identity.”101  
While groups of people within a nation are linked geographically, within a
corporation, employees are linked by a common purpose and by information.  Large
companies, like Coca-Cola, McDonald’s, Shell, and Wal-Mart, export their corporate
cultures as they establish operations abroad.  Companies with cultures ranging from
laid-back to highly formal will retain some aspects of their respective cultures abroad.
Companies hire local executive talent and instill the companies’ cultural values in these
new executives. The executives will then spread these values to other entities when
they deal with suppliers and customers or if they transfer to different companies. 
Not surprisingly, one of the most challenging aspects of merging two corporations
is integrating disparate cultures after the closing date of the merger.102  Corporations
can prosper when a merger enhances the surviving corporation’s culture by
incorporating the best aspects of the target’s culture.  Sometimes, however, the worst
aspects of both corporations’ culture survive in the new entity and the corporation is
weakened.  Another important issue that arises during many mergers, according to
organizational psychologists, is the acculturation of new employees.103  This is
especially true for multinational corporations; the issue for these companies is how best
to form a common culture across varying geographic, ethnic, and religious areas and
time zones.104  
Another characteristic of the permanent population of a nation-state is that citizens
of the state have the right of suffrage and may vote on significant issues and for
political candidates.  As the global business population becomes more transient, this
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105. The approach to suffrage as one of inclusion or exclusion of resident non-citizens often depends
on the nation’s view of voting either as a fundamental human right or merely as a citizen’s right.  See
generally Harald Waldrauch, Electoral Rights for Foreign Nationals: A Comparative Overview of
Regulations in 36 Countries (European Ctr. for Soc. Welfare Policy, Paper No. 73, 2003), available at
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106. Treaty on European Union tit. II, art. 86 (Maastricht Treaty), Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247, 1992 O.J.
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107. See al-Hibri, supra note 101, at 1451.  Professor al-Hibri notes that 
the term “corporate democracy” usually refers to shareholder rights, which reflects a view
of the corporation as a polis where only the “owners of shares” count as citizens.  In political
terms, shareholders of a corporation are the only citizens of the corporate polis, and only
citizens vote.  Put in this way, we now recognize that our legal system does not view non-
shareholders as “citizens.”  This is analogous to a familiar political situation in our past
where only landowners had the right to vote in an election and the non-landed, non-owners
had no voting rights.  We have since recognized in the political arena that those who do not
own land are nevertheless an integral part of the citizenship of our country.  The same
recognition seems to be overdue in corporate law and practice.  Getting to it, however, will
require a major ideological/conceptual shift not only in the concept of “corporate
citizenship,” but also in the concept of the “corporation” itself.
Id.
108. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.) 1949 I.C.J. 4, 43 (Apr. 9) (separate opinion of Judge Alvarez)
(“By sovereignty, we understand the whole body of rights and attributes which a State possesses in its
may mean that individuals vote on issues and candidates in states other than the one
in which they reside.  Some nation-states are inclusionary, giving residents or other
groups of non-citizens the right to vote.105  Other nation-states are exclusionary,
limiting suffrage to those who are citizens.  In the European Union, for example,
suffrage is based on residence rather than citizenship.  Residents, regardless of
citizenship, have the right to vote and to stand for political office.106  
As corporations take on more of the attributes of government, the impact on the
voting rights of citizens must be considered.  The franchise rights of corporate
shareholders become ever more important as the corporations in which they have
purchased shares become more powerful actors on the global stage.107  Similarly, as
corporate powers increase, the right to run for public office may become less important
than the right to climb the corporate ladder or otherwise influence the activities of
corporations.  
Ideally, corporations engage in succession planning for all of the senior positions
within the organization.  But like the political climate within a particular country, a
political climate can develop within a corporation.  Executives align themselves with
managers or directors, whom they believe may someday manage the entire
organization, in an effort to rise to power on the manager or director’s coattails.
Sometimes, just as in countries, coups occur within a corporation.  When a CEO or
senior executive is fired and another is appointed, jockeying for position and lobbying
for board member votes becomes common.  
Control over a defined territory, usually to the exclusion of all other states, is
another typical attribute of sovereignty.108  According to the Restatement (Third) of
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territory, to the exclusion of all other States, and also in its relations with other States.”).  But see 2 KARL
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111. Schachter, supra note 2, at 8 (“The mobility of capital and technology—plus the global
communications networks—is viewed as obliterating spatial lines, making nonsense of geographic
demarcations.”).  For additional articles on the topics of sub-state nationalism and indigenous peoples, see
S. James Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The Move Toward the Multicultural
State, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 13 (2004); Erica-Irene Daes, The Concepts of Self-Determination and
Autonomy of Indigenous Peoples in the Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 259 (2002); Hurst Hannun, New Developments in Indigenous Rights, 28
VA. J. INT’L L. 649 (1988); Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global
Comparative and International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 57 (1999).
112. CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ce.html
(last visited Nov. 26, 2007).   
113. CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gh.html
(last visited Nov. 26, 2007). 
114. CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ho.html
(last visited Nov. 26, 2007). 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, a state has “jurisdiction to prescribe law
with respect to . . . conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its
territory; . . . the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory; . . .
[and] conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect
within its territory.”109  
Although territory is viewed as a characteristic of the state, land, as one of the
means of production, is less significant now than ever before.  This decrease in
significance is the result of information, which has taken its place with land, labor, and
capital as a means of production.  With respect to territory, size is largely irrelevant to
the issue of statehood and can range from as little as 100 acres to an entire continent.110
Geographic borders may be disputed between neighboring states, making the territory of
a state murkily defined.  Similarly, even geographic borders lack the political significance
that they once had as capital, people, and information cross borders with ease.111  
B.  Economic Power
Today’s Brobdingnagian corporations may never gain the measure of power held
by the earliest companies during their peak, but the largest corporations still
economically dwarf many developing nations.  The tremendous power of multinational
corporations can be partially explained by their sheer size.  A few of the very largest
companies have the power to make—or destroy—markets of particular products or in
particular places.
The largest corporations have annual revenues that are multiples of the gross
domestic products of many nations.  For example, the gross domestic product (on a
purchasing power parity basis) for three developing countries in different regions in
2006 was as follows: Sri Lanka, $95.46 billion;112 Ghana, $60 billion;113 and Honduras,
$22.54 billion.114  In contrast, the world’s largest corporations had revenues in 2006
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Nov. 4, 2007).
117. John Porretto, Exxon Mobil Posts Record Annual Profit, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 1, 2007,
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121. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 15, at 176.   
of several times these amounts.  Wal-Mart’s revenues were $315.6 billion,115 British
Petroleum’s revenues were $265.9 billion,116 Exxon Mobil’s revenues were $377.64
billion,117 and Royal Dutch/Shell Group’s revenues were $306.7 billion.118  In fact, of
the three countries just mentioned, Sri Lanka’s $95.46 billion is closest to the 2006
revenues of Nippon Telegraph & Telephone, which ranked number 24 on the 2006
Fortune Global 500 list.119  Wal-Mart’s revenue in 2006 was approximately fourteen
times the GDP of Honduras, with Honduras bested by 281 of the Fortune 500
companies in 2006.120
These staggering discrepancies in the GDPs of some developing countries and the
revenues of the largest corporations mean that foreign corporations have the capacity
to exert tremendous influence over the economic stability of developing nations.  If one
or more large companies divests or sources product elsewhere, the impact could be
devastating to a developing nation. Similarly, a decision to source products in a
developing nation could have a tremendously positive economic impact by creating
jobs and providing a tax base. 
It is important to note, however, that although corporations have grown
tremendously in size over the past few decades, some authors have downplayed the
importance of this growth.  John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge note that the
growth of corporations has not kept pace with the economic growth of nations and that
“wealth is not the same as power.” 121  The authors explain:
The idea that companies are getting too big is a gross abuse of statistics. Far from
gaining economic clout, the biggest multinationals have been losing it. Over the past
twenty years, the world’s biggest fifty firms have grown more slowly than the world
economy as a whole. In most countries the average size of companies is going down
not up. 
And what exactly do we mean by companies being the same size as states? By
some measures, Wal-Mart, the biggest company in 2000, is as rich as Peru. But is it
as powerful? Think what the government of Peru can do. It has powers beyond Wal-
Mart’s belief.  It can coerce you to join the army, force you to pay taxes, arrest and
imprison security chiefs and terrorists. Wal-Mart has no equivalent powers. Yes, it
makes profits round the world but in many ways it is far more hemmed in than the
148 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1
122. Id. 
123. Id.
124. Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, supra note 74, 49 Stat. at 3097, 165
L.N.T.S. at 19; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 201 (1986). 
125. OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 89,  § 33, at 120.
126. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
127. MADAWI AL-RASHEED, A HISTORY OF SAUDI ARABIA 117 (2002) (“During the war, as far as Saudi
Arabia was concerned, ARAMCO was the ‘United States’. . . .  ARAMCO was responsible for facilitating
contact between the USA and Saudi Arabia.”).
128. Windows to be Localized in 14 Indian Languages, THE TRIBUNE ONLINE EDITION (Chandigarh,
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giants of yesteryear. The East India Company had an army of 200,000 people. Wal-
Mart is simply rather good at retailing. 122 
Micklethwait and Wooldridge also stress that globalization has, as a rule, tended to
help small companies rather than large ones, and that governments may still exercise
their powers to curtail the power of these large multinational corporations, as the
Department of Justice did by filing an antitrust suit against Microsoft.123
C.  Capacity to Engage in Foreign Relations
As noted previously, the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties
of States lists as a characteristic of states the “capacity to enter into relations with other
States.”124  Recognition by other countries is also viewed as a test, even though some
nations may dispute the right to exist or the territory of a particular state.125  
Modern corporations, particularly those with international operations, do enter into
relations with nations other than their home country.  In fact, corporations engage in
foreign relations in a variety of ways, many of them very similar to the ways in which
nations deal with each other.  For example, corporations engage in diplomacy,
establish outposts in other nations, engage in trade negotiations, and often serve as
proxies for their home country’s government.
Under the agency theory of corporations, the executives of a company are the
agents of the corporation’s shareholders.126  As such, these agents are charged with
making money for the shareholders, not with formulating international policy.  Yet in
the course of pursuing profits, that is precisely what executives in multinational
corporations do.  The CEO and other senior executives often meet with trade ministers
and heads of state.  During and following World War II, the United States engaged in
foreign relations with Saudi Arabia primarily through ARAMCO.127  There are several
more recent examples, as well.  In late 2004, Microsoft’s Steve Ballmer met with
India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.128  In April of 2006, in his first official visit
to the United States, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited with Microsoft and Boeing
executives before visiting the White House.129  By visiting with the CEOs of these
companies first, China sent the message that relations between the Chinese government
and industry have priority over relations between the two governments.130 
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134. SHAUN RIORDAN, THE NEW DIPLOMACY 4 (2003) (“[M]inisters will often know their opposite
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135. Where the market entry will be through acquisition, companies are less likely to establish offices
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136. RIORDAN, supra note 134, at 4 (arguing that traditional diplomatic approaches are lacking and that
the private sector must play a role in diplomacy).
137. Id. at 9 (asserting that, at the multinational level, many firms shun overt national identification).
In addition, companies will occasionally hold board meetings in the countries
where they have operations.  This gives the non-executive directors an opportunity to
review the company’s foreign operations.  When a foreign company holds a board
meeting, the prime minister and other government officials may attend a portion of the
meeting or a reception or dinner in connection with the meeting.  Credit Suisse, BHP
Billiton, and Sony Ericsson Mobile Communications AB have all held board meetings
in China.131  Wal-Mart has held board meetings in Canada, China, and Mexico.  Perot
Systems met in India.132  Meeting in countries where these mega-corporations have
operations shows a commitment to future development in the country.133  Directors
who may be asked to vote on significant capital expenditures are more comfortable
doing so if they have seen first hand the company’s operations in a particular country.
The presence of the head of state or cabinet ministers at the board meeting gives the
directors further assurance that the company is welcome in the country and signals the
value that the country’s leaders place on the corporation’s presence in their country.
Furthermore, large multinational corporations understand the importance of
effective government relations and often establish offices in capital cities throughout
the world.  The need for an office in a particular capital has somewhat diminished in
recent years as technology has advanced, giving executives easier ways to arrange for
meeting with foreign diplomats.134  Even if the company has not yet entered a particular
market, it may establish an office to monitor legislative developments, engage in
government relations, identify local executive talent, and assess potential joint venture
partners.135  Establishing an office and engaging in various forms of foreign relations
also allows a company to transcend uncomfortable relations between its host country
and its home country.136  In the past few years, for companies based in the United
States or Great Britain, this has meant overcoming the unpopularity of their home
countries’ foreign policies.  Where the head of state is unpopular abroad, companies
that seek to engage in business internationally must take additional steps to build
constructive relationships and to distance themselves from politicians at home.137
Former diplomat Shaun Riordan wrote in his book The New Diplomacy that
multinational corporations’ “economic strength, combined with international networks
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that frequently outstrip (and outperform) those of traditional diplomatic services, make
them more influential than many states.  Their interventions are no longer limited to
narrowly defined commercial interests.  The more forward-thinking corporations are
already carving out a role in the design of any future global governance.”138  
One important way that multinational corporations establish their “role in the
design of any future global governance”139 is by engaging in trade negotiations, either
directly or indirectly, through their chartering nations’ trade representatives.  Adam
Smith wrote in 1783 that trade regulations “may, I think, be demonstrated to be in
every case a complete piece of dupery, by which the interest of the State and the nation
is constantly sacrificed to that of some particular class of traders.”140  While trade
policies may be motivated in part by the desires of a “particular class of traders,” they
are also affected by the desires of the nations to court foreign investment.  This
competition has been characterized by some as a “race to the bottom,” in which
countries offer cheap labor and substandard health and environmental standards in
order to attract corporate investment.141
Trade policy remains in many ways a mechanism for enrichment and protection
of companies.142  Corporations are stakeholders in trade policy decisions and also
engage in commercial diplomacy, negotiating their own trade deals in countries where
they wish to conduct or expand their business.  Corporate executives often deal
extensively with politicians, regulators, and policy makers on trade and investment
issues that affect their organization.  As explained above, these issues implicate not
only traditional trade matters, but also environmental, labor, consumer protection, and
other concerns.143
 Beyond negotiating trade conditions between a corporation and a host country,
a corporation often negotiates taxation as well.  Unlike individuals, corporations have
some ability to set their own rates of taxation, and often negotiate inducement
agreements with various levels of govnerment.144  Switzerland, for example, has been
successful in attracting intellectual property holding companies largely because it
offers generally low taxes and no up-front taxes on royalties.145  Companies often
arbitrage tax treatment by taking advantage of the price differential between
countries.146 All other things being equal, a corporation will locate its business in the
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country that gives it the best “deal” on taxes—and, as previously noted, this “deal” is
often the subject of negotiation.  
Furthermore, corporations can be viewed by the people of other nations as
representatives of the entity’s home country.  We saw this recently as Gulf retailers
boycotted Danish companies after Jyllands-Posten printed offensive cartoons ridiculing
the Prophet Mohammed.147  In Europe, some restaurants boycotted American products,
such as Coca-Cola and Budweiser, and refused to accept American Express cards in
protest of the war in Iraq.148  These companies were targeted, not because of their own
actions, but as proxies for the American government.  
The home governments of multinational corporations also use these companies as
diplomatic tools.149  Governments sometimes request that corporations conduct
business in a certain way or in a certain place to facilitate foreign relations.  In
addition, a number of functions that have historically been within the purview of the
state are now being privatized.  One result of such privatization is that it allows states
to distance themselves from treaty obligations.  Legitimate concerns have been raised
by some authors about the extent to which privatizing certain activities may lead to
circumvention of treaties and international norms of human rights.150
D.  Protection of Society
The International Committee of Jurists, appointed by the Council of the League
of Nations, took the view that statehood cannot co-exist with anarchy.  Rather, a state
does not exist until a situation “is of a definite and normal character.”151 Sovereignty
does not exist in some situations, “either because the state is not yet fully formed or
because it is undergoing transformation or dissolution [and in such cases], the situation
is obscure and uncertain from a legal point of view, and will not become clear until the
period of development is completed and a definite new situation, which is normal in
respect to territorial sovereignty, has been established.”152  Once created, one attribute
of the state becomes the protection of minorities, which is often codified in the states’
constitutions.153  In order to maintain security and stability, governments establish
armies to protect themselves from other nations and police forces to keep order
internally.  The pendulum seems to have swung back somewhat to the days of Henry
Fielding’s Bow Street Runners.  
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increasingly important relief valve for public systems at or near capacity.”); Ira P. Robbins, The Legal
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government began looking seriously into privatizing the running of America’s prisons and jails in order to
reduce some of the stress on state and federal government, and explaining the legal issues associated
therewith).
Within this climate, corporations routinely exercise police powers, in some cases
displacing traditional state functions.  For instance, while it is unlikely that we will ever
see corporate armies comparable in size to that of the East India Company,154
companies in many industries continue to establish private security forces.155  This
practice is particularly prevalent where states are unable or unwilling to provide
necessary police functions, such as guarding corporate facilities, investigating crimes,
or protecting employees.156  Corporations have even funded other nations’ armies or
police forces in certain circumstances.  For example, western oil companies—Shell,
in particular—have been charged with arming and employing security forces to quell
opposition to oil exploration and production in the Niger Delta.157  Some governments
have also contracted away the police function by bidding out the building and running
of prisons to private enterprises.  Privatizing prisons has become more common in
recent years.158  
The police function has also been partially replaced in recent years by the increase
in the size and power of internal audit groups within most large corporations.  While
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internal audit groups exist to help “an organization accomplish its objectives by
bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness
of risk management, control, and governance processes,”159 the internal audit group
will also investigate suspected criminal activity as a part of these functions.  Internal
auditors seek evidence of violation of the laws or of internal controls by employees.160
To find these violations, they engage in investigatory work, such as interviewing
witnesses and forensic accounting.  If evidence of criminal activity is identified,
internal audit groups may turn over the results of their investigation to local law
enforcement authorities.161  The internal audit departments of large multinational
corporations can complement understaffed or poorly trained law enforcement within
the host country by uncovering and documenting evidence of criminal activity.
Corporations also engage outside law firms to assist in-house counsel with
investigations into possible violations of the law.  This process can in some ways be
analogized to investigations conducted by law enforcement agencies, although there
can be problems associated with the investigation that would not necessarily exist if a
law enforcement agency were conducting the investigation.  As recent press about
Hewlett-Packard indicated, there can be questions about whether the investigation itself
is conducted in a legal manner.162  Furthermore, the outside law firm may in effect be
investigating its own actions, as was alleged when Enron engaged its outside firm to
investigate complaints made by Sherron Watkins about transactions in which the firm
participated as counsel to the company.163  
E.  Administration of Justice
A nation regulates its citizens by enacting laws and establishing a police force and
a court system to assure compliance with those laws.  While corporations have been
long recognized as possessing authority to quasi-legislate regarding internal matters,164
154 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1
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a certain sense legislative bodies.  They have a legislative power when the directors or
shareholders are duly convened that is fully adequate to settle all questions affecting their
business interests or policy . . . .
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1, at 341 (Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W. Naimark eds., 2005). 
167. Executive Summary, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CORPORATE ATTITUDES AND PRACTICE 2006
(Price Waterhouse Coopers/Univ. of London Sch. of Int’l Arbitration, London), May 2006, at 2, available
at http://www.pwc.com/extweb/pwcpublications.nsf/docid/B6C01BC8008DD57680257171003177F0/$
file/pwc_IA_Study.pdf.
168. Schachter, supra note 2, at 12. 
169. See generally Cecilia H. Morgan, Employment Dispute Resolution Processes 2004, 11 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 31 (2004); CPR INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, INC., HOW COMPANIES MANAGE
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES: A COMPENDIUM OF LEADING CORPORATE EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS 43 (2002).
Following the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S.
20 (1991), employers have been requiring that employees agree to arbitrate employment disputes as a
condition of employment.  The Supreme Court stated in Gilmer that “[m]ere inequality in bargaining power
. . . is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment
context.” Id. at 33; see also Kenneth F. Dunham, Sailing Around Erie: The Emergence of a Federal
General Common Law of Arbitration, 6 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 197, 222 (2006) (noting that although
employees may be bound to arbitrate, the federal government is likely exempt from those arbitration
provisions); Kenneth F. Dunham, Great Gilmer’s Ghost: The Haunting Tale of the Role of Employment
Arbitration in the Disappearance of Statutory Rights in Discrimination Cases, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
303, 324-25 (2005) (discussing how businesses profit from the fact that statutory rights are poorly protected
in employment discrimination cases).
170. See, e.g., Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 161-62 (1978) (noting that the settlement of disputes
between private parties is not an exclusive governmental function).
in recent decades, corporations have also partially supplanted legislative bodies, the
police function, and the courts.165
Corporations have gradually supplanted court systems in several respects.  They
use arbitration and mediation clauses in contracts that require parties to place their
disputes before third parties rather than the court system.  Studies found that between
1993 and 2003, international arbitration proceedings more than doubled.166  A 2006
study by Price Waterhouse Coopers, in conjunction with the Queen Mary University
of London School of International Arbitration, found that 73% of surveyed
corporations prefer to use international arbitration to resolve cross-border disputes.167
The use of arbitration “is a factor in transforming private contract practices into
authoritative law for the business community.”168
Corporations also use grievance clauses in employee contracts to control internal
disputes, requiring employees to file and pursue their complaints through internal
corporate processes, rather than seek redress from the courts.169  Thus, while we
typically think of resolution of disputes as a core function of the judiciary, it is
certainly not the exclusive province of government.170  Corporations tend to favor
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J. 189 (1997).
172. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Online Standardization and the Integration of Text and
Machine, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125 (2002); Margaret Jane Radin, Regime Change in Intellectual
Property: Superseding the Law of the State with the “Law” of the Firm, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 173
(2003).
173. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1979) (emphasis added).
174. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 3 (1982).
175. Keith Highet, The Enigma of the Lex Mercatoria, 63 TUL. L. REV. 613, 613 (1989) (citing Georges
R. Delaume, Comparative Analysis as a Basis of Law in State Contracts: The Myth of the Lex Mercatoria,
63 TUL. L. REV. 577 (1988)).
176. Id. at 614.
177. Schachter, supra note 2, at 12.  
arbitration of employee grievances because, as a rule, both costs of litigation and size
of judgments are lower.171
Additionally, companies are increasingly utilizing “machine rule” as a means of
partially replacing enforcement of contracts by the courts.  For example, software code
can automatically enforce termination provisions in license agreements, without the
need for lawyers and judges to become involved.172  Machine rule is arguably a
perfected replacement for the court systems because alternative dispute provisions are
inchoate enforcement mechanisms in that they are not self-enforcing.  Thus, if one
party does not comply with the alternative dispute resolution provision, the other party
must seek an injunction to force compliance with the provision.  Where machine rule
supplants court enforcement, it is unnecessary for the party seeking enforcement of the
termination provision in an agreement to seek the assistance of the courts.
Despite these perceived efficiencies, the devolution of contract enforcement
mechanisms to private enterprise raises important questions about the nature of
contracts themselves.  The Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines a contract as “a
promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the
performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”173  Professor
Farnsworth describes a contract as “a promise, or a set of promises, that the law will
enforce or at least recognize in some way.”174  The natural question, then, is whether
private agreements are themselves law.  If an agreement is not a contract unless the law
will enforce it, are self-enforcing private agreements even contracts?  
In a similar vein, the easy transfer of global capital across national boundaries has
facilitated the international development of a body of business law known as the lex
mercatoria.  In a symposium at Tulane Law School in 1999, Keith Highet posed the
question, “Has the lex mercatoria replaced national laws in the interpretation of
transnational or international mixed contracts?”175   Highet posited that “[t]he only way
in which a contract can exist independently of a legal system is to consider it as a
voluntary compact operating by virtue of the collective will of the parties . . . . The
force of the obligation in a contract comes from the force of the legal system that
creates the obligation.”176  Others have viewed the lex mercatoria as the “lawyers’ law”
that may not originate from legislative or judicial act, but that still operates to
“transform[] private contract practices into authoritative law for the business
community.”177  
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See Carnero v. Boston Scientific Corp., 433 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that the civil whistleblower
protection provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not have extraterritorial application).  Some
extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws is appropriate and necessary to protect U.S. investors.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 416, cmt. a (1987) (the reach and application
of federal securities laws depends upon their reasonableness and linkage to the protection of American
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184. See generally Backer, supra note 73 (considering the ramifications of current efforts to
internationalize regulation of corporate social responsibility). 
185. Jose A. Tabuena & Chris Mondini, Internal Reporting and Whistleblowing, in BUSINESS AGAINST
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A recent article by Larry Catá Backer explores Wal-Mart’s role as a global
legislator.178  Professor Backer argues that “old rule-making monopolies have been
weakened and powerful non-state actors [have] become free to order their relations,
subject ultimately only to their stakeholders.”179  Wal-Mart’s impact on other
companies, through its power in the global supply chain, has enabled it to create
private international law through its standardized vendor agreements and other
activities.  According to Professor Backer, “one company, even one very large and
influential company, does not a system [of private laws] make.  But Wal-Mart is
pointing the way to the establishment of a new reality, a reality that is not waiting for
theory for justification, or permission for implementation.”180  
A corporation may “legislate” in other nations by importing its chartering nation’s
laws, which often have extraterritorial effect.  For example, both the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act181 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,182 passed by the United States Congress,
have extraterritorial application.183  As companies establish operations in other
countries, they export the laws of their chartering nations to the host country.  While
the laws from a company’s chartering country apply only to the subsidiary, application
of these laws to foreign companies can have a normative influence within the host
country as employees transition into and out of the subsidiary and as local companies
emulate business practices of the multinational.  
Corporations regulate their employees abroad by establishing policies to govern
employees’ behavior.  These corporate policies include ethics, operating, and social
responsibility guidelines.184  When multinational corporations impose their home
country’s moral and legal concepts on their foreign subsidiaries, these concepts do not
always translate well across cultures.  For example, as U.S. companies invested in
Germany, it became clear that hotlines to facilitate anonymous reporting of policy
violations were eschewed in Germany.185  In contrast, in many instances, the multi-
national corporation’s policies and guidelines could potentially complement the host
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country’s laws.186  This “importation” of policies and guidelines can be important to
developing countries, whose regulatory agencies lack expertise or financial resources.
Admittedly, however, despite these activities by corporations, the discipline that
a corporation can impose on an employee differs greatly from the discipline that a state
can impose on its citizens. Corporations are constrained from regulating their
employees in ways that nations are not.  While a corporation typically communicates
that a violation of company policy may result in disciplinary action up to and including
termination, the ultimate sanction is limited to firing the employee.  A state, however,
can discipline a citizen through its penal system, using fines, incarceration and even,
in some instances, capital punishment.  
Allowing private companies to engage in regulatory actions is yet another way in
which the police function of states has been transferred to private enterprise.187  Often,
we see examples of self-regulation used to preempt governmental regulation in certain
areas.188  In other instances, we see the government ceding regulatory rights to private
entities.189 Of course, these private entities have no obligation to engage in the type of
“notice-and-comment” rulemaking expected of true regulatory agencies.190
F.  Monetary Policy
Corporations often participate in—and sometimes make— policies at the national
level.  This is true in many areas, including monetary policy.  Private corporations
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In all these cases the impulse comes from the political action of the State,
jurisprudence only drawing its conclusions from the State’s action as it needs them.
KNAPP, supra note 193, at 40.
196. DAVIES, supra note 194, at 26.
197. See Global Financial Data, supra note 14; Greenwood, supra note 9, at 3 (citing M.F. LINDLEY,
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influence monetary policy in significant ways, both in their home nations and in host
countries abroad.191  In some instances, even today, private corporations may even be
viewed as creating currency, a function normally reserved to states.  Originally, the
only involvement of the state with respect to money was the minting of coins.192  The
state theory of money gained traction in the early part of the twentieth century with
Georg Knapp’s book on the subject.193  Knapp, who greatly influenced John Maynard
Keynes,194 viewed the state as “the sole creator and guarantor of money.”195
Glyn Davies wrote that Knapp’s view “carries the state theory of money to an
absurd extreme.”196  In fact, the limitations of the state’s role can be seen from the fact
that some of the earliest corporations minted coins.197  Davies noted, “right from the
inception of money, from ancient down to modern times, the state has a powerful,
though not omnipotent, role to play in the development of money.  Yet neither ancient
money nor . . . even the Bank of England, is a mere creature of the state.”198  The
modern view of monetary policy views the market, rather than the state, as the supreme
authority, although there are limits to this view.199  Professor Ludwig von Mises
explained that “[t]he concept of money as a creature of law and the state is clearly
untenable.  It is not justified by a single market phenomenon of the market.  To ascribe
to the state the power of dictating the laws of exchange, is to ignore the fundamental
principles of money-using society.”200
Because of the state’s role in the creation of money, currency is useful only where
a state’s law applies.201  Yet the easy transferability of capital in today’s markets makes
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it difficult for nations to apply exchange controls.202  Further, as governments court
foreign investment, they often do so by deregulating, creating a “race to the bottom.”203
Establishment of a currency and payment system is often recognized as a characteris-
tic of a sovereign nation.  While the earliest forms of currency mooed and brayed, today,
most of us carry several denominations of government-issued paper money in our wallets.
We also use debit cards, credit cards, and gift cards to engage in consumer transactions.
Futurists have been predicting for the past decade or more that a cashless society is in the
offing.  This cashless society will be the result of the privatization of the issuance of
currency.  This privatization of currency has several effects.
Economists define “seignorage” as “[t]he amount of real purchasing power that [a]
government can extract from the public by printing money.”204  Seignorage can include
the interest-free use of the money by a government, because it may immediately exchange
the currency for goods or services.205  When a country replaces its domestic currency with
the U.S. dollar, a process known as “dollarization,”206 it in essence transfers its stream of
seignorage revenue to the U.S. central bank.207  When the Euro was created, a seignorage
sharing agreement was necessary among the countries comprising the European Union
to replace the seignorage revenue associated with fiat money.208
Just as dollarization affects seignorage revenue, so too does electronic money.209
Electronic money can take several forms, including stored value cards, more
commonly referred to as gift cards.  Many businesses that deal directly with consumers
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issue stored value cards that can be used by the holder to redeem goods or services
from the issuer or from other businesses that have contracted with the issuer.  During
2006, gift cards in the United States represented a total stored value of almost $25
billion.210  These stored value cards affect currency in circulation because they reduce
the necessary circulation of notes and coins.211  Debit transactions are another form of
electronic currency and have a similar effect.  Debit transactions increased from 8.3
billion transactions in 2000 to 15.6 billion in 2003.212  According to the Federal
Reserve, debit cards are “used for small-value payments more commonly than other
payment instruments except electronic benefits transfers and, perhaps, cash.”213  At
some point, debit and credit cards may replace lower value denominations, and perhaps
paper checks, all of which may eventually become obsolete.214  Finally, other forms of
electronic transactions, such as PayPal or similar Internet payment mechanisms may
also have the effect of reducing seignorage revenue that has typically been available
to governments.215
As these types of electronic payments become more common, private enterprise
is affecting monetary policy.  It is issuing private money, which substitutes for
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government fiat currency.  The government loses the seignorage revenue that would
have been associated with these amounts.  In addition, reserve balances at the central
bank may be affected by this substitution of electronic, privately issued money for fiat
currency.216
The discussion above centers on monetary policy issues associated with the
issuance of electronic currency within the parent company’s home nation or within the
countries in which the parent company’s subsidiaries operate.  Nations that host the
subsidiaries of multinational corporations face additional issues regarding repatriation
of funds to the company’s home country.   Multinational corporations may be required
to negotiate with the central bank regarding processes for and constraints on
repatriation of funds to their home country, or even to their subsidiary in another
country that essentially serves as the “bank” for the operations of the corporation in
various other countries.
In addition to issues of seignorage and repatriation, private corporations can
dramatically affect the international currency markets.217  While there is an obvious
impact associated with the export and import activity of private corporations, this
impact can be seen most dramatically in connection with merger and acquisition
transactions.  For example, a corporation based in the United States that is engaged in
an acquisition of several billion dollars in another country will most likely have to
acquire that country’s currency to complete the transaction and pay the target
company’s shareholders.  If the acquiring company enters the market for Mexican
pesos with an appetite for such a large volume of pesos, this buy-side pressure could
artificially inflate the value of the peso for a brief period of time and artificially
increase the costs of the acquisition by the acquirer. The government of the target’s
home country will prefer a stable currency market.  National banking regulators may,
therefore, work with the acquiring company to assure that acquisitions of the currency
occur in a measured manner that is unlikely to artificially inflate the price of the
currency.  
G.  Public Welfare
Citizens have traditionally looked to the government to provide utilities, roads,
bridges, airports, telecommunications, clean drinking water, and sewage treatment.
Historically, however, corporations have played a role in the provision of such services
as well.  Indeed, almost from the inception of the corporate form, corporations have
been viewed as serving a public function.218  One scholar has noted that:
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Although many corporate charters granted after 1800 for canals, turnpikes, and banks
went to private business entrepreneurs, these corporations did not operate as private
businesses in the same sense as unincorporated businesses.  To encourage much
needed improvements, the early special charters normally granted privileges in the
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While the reference to public institutions includes obvious things such as buildings,
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that of making money for their owners.221  However, corporate social responsibility has
developed into an area of concern for corporations and an area of study by scholars in
the last few decades.222  Corporate social responsibility focuses on the ways that
corporations can help to address various social issues that are not necessarily issues of
immediate impact to the corporations’ business.223  Cynics have observed that even
socially responsible actions by corporations are geared toward the corporate imperative
of profit-making.224
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arrangements with the local government.  Increasingly, private companies engage in
these enterprises, particularly in developing nations where the tax base needed to
finance these projects is limited.  Specifically, many developing countries now look to
private corporations “to provide basic infrastructure or utility services, such as
highways, railways, water, sanitation, electricity, gas, and telecommunications.”225
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my employer, it shows the amount of taxes withheld in several areas.  My employer is acting as the agent
for the government in withholding those taxes and paying them over to the government on my behalf.
Similarly, corporations collect taxes at the cash register and remit those taxes to state and local authorities.
In addition, the legal obligations of corporations to escheat to the state abandoned property can be viewed
as a way in which corporations collect taxes on behalf of the government.
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Some private infrastructure projects have succeeded, but others have failed
spectacularly.226  The models for these projects are varied, with private companies
sometimes assuming management of a government-owned project or leasing the
underlying assets.  In other instances, the private company may finance the project and
assume all risk, just as with other commercial enterprises.227 
The U.S. government has also used corporations to assist in disaster relief and
international public relations.  For example, after the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan,
several American CEOs traveled there with Karen Hughes, Bush’s Under Secretary for
Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, to assist in raising funds for earthquake relief.228
Corporations have also engaged in disaster relief sua sponte.  In connection with
Hurricane Katrina, some commentators jokingly suggested that the United States
Federal Emergency Management Agency could learn from Wal-Mart’s logistical
system.229  Home Depot and Federal Express were also lauded as examples of
organizations with excellent disaster preparedness response plans.230  Recently, the
Business Roundtable launched a new web site dedicated to the coordination of
corporate disaster response.231  These examples prove that corporations can provide
assistance, such as logistical services and supplies, and coordination of economic
resources, in ways that have historically been reserved to governments.
IV.  CONCLUSION
The implications of the nation-state metaphor as a way of viewing corporations
are significant.  To the extent that the transformation continues, the power of the vote
in a democratic society may be eroded by the power of votes purchased through share
ownership and the roles that our elected officials play may become less important than
the roles played by corporate executives.  Our security will become ever more
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dependent on the power and security of the world’s largest corporations.  Personal
identity will continue its shift from national identity and regional identity to corporate
identity.  Our legal matters may be brought before private judges and arbitrators, or
handled through machine rule.  And even our wallets are affected, as we need to carry
very little cash issued by state treasuries.  
Although some transference of sovereign powers to corporations is occurring, the
implications are not all negative.  After all, corporations, with their profit-maximizing
motives, use economic resources efficiently.  Standards of living are high in countries
with vibrant capital markets and laws promoting entrepreneurship.  
  The metaphor of the nation-state provides one more way for scholars to analyze
the activities and powers of corporations.  Rather than looking at the balance of power
within corporations, as do the director-primacy and shareholder-primacy models, this
metaphor provides a way to view corporations as participants in broader governance
processes such as foreign relations, adjudication, and law making.
